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Abstract: Within Jean Paul Sartre’s atheistic program, he objected to Christian mysticism 
as a delusory desire for substantive being. I suggest that a Christian mystic might reply to 
Sartre’s attack by claiming that Sartre indeed grasps something right about the human 
condition but falls short of fully understanding what he grasps. Then I argue that the true 
basis of Sartre’s atheism is neither philosophical nor existentialist, but rather mystical. 
Sartre had an early mystical atheistic intuition that later developed into atheistic mystical 
experience. Sartre experienced the non-existence of God.
Jean Paul Sartre called himself a “material” atheist, one who not only 
believes that God does not exist but is profoundly aware of God’s absence. 
This is to be compared to a group of people who meet regularly at a coffee 
house in Paris. One evening Pierre does not come. The entire evening, 
those present feel Pierre’s absence, his absence is tangible, part of the 
scene, like the tables and the chairs. Pierre is missing. Just so, for Sartre, 
God’s absence is to be felt everywhere. God is missing. And since God is 
missing we are to feel the obligation to create ourselves in freedom.
Within his program of material atheism, Sartre enunciated a critique 
of Christian mysticism. In his book on Jean Genet, Sartre defined “mysti-
cism,” in general, as follows: “The quest for a state in which subject and 
object, consciousness and being, the eternal and the particular, merge 
in an absolute undifferentiation.”1 Elsewhere in the same book, Sartre 
characterizes Christian mysticism in particular as follows: “It is God who 
will attain himself in the mystical ecstasy, which is a fusion of the Subject 
and the Object. There is thus nothing to do but to await the sudden 
figuration that will fill us with being…” (p. 247). Here are some examples 
1 Jean Paul Sartre, Saint Genet: trns Bernard Frechtman (New York, 1963, G. Braziller 
Publishers), p. 76. All references to Sartre’s book on Genet are to this volume. 
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with which I am familiar of what Sartre had in mind when writing of 
the “fusion of Subject and Object.” The early Christian mystic, Evagrius 
Ponticus (345-399) spoke of the experience of his self-emptying into God 
as akin to rivers flowing into the ocean. Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) 
wrote of his relationship to God as one of “iron within the fire and the 
fire within the iron,” and Meister Eckhart (1260-1328) declared that, “God 
and I are one.” In such cases, and others, the Christian mystic alleges 
that his true being is in God or identical with God. “The eternal and the 
particular, merge in an absolute undifferentiation.”
In what follows, I will first present Sartre’s objection to Christian 
mysticism. Then I will suggest what a Christian mystic might want to 
say in reply to Sartre. Lastly, I want to venture what was the true basis of 
Sartre’s material atheism of which his rejection of Christian mysticism 
is a part. I will argue that at the bottom of Sartre’s material atheism was 
a mysticism of a different sort – atheistic mysticism.
I.
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre articulates two exclusive ontological 
categories: One is the “in-itself,” including bare phenomenological 
content and the non-human furniture of the universe. The in-itself has 
what Sartre calls identity with itself; it has self-substance in itself, by 
itself, possessing givenness like a stone. Not so human beings, who are 
“for-themselves.” In virtue of our consciousness, we “have nothing of our 
selves.” Brentano made a big deal of the intentionality of consciousness, 
this being the difference for him between mind and non-mind. Sartre 
made an even a bigger deal out of intentionality – for him a person is 
nothing other than a consciousness going out to the in-itself, a taking on 
of the content of the in-itself, and never having self-substantive existence. 
Thus, consciousness is always a going out from itself “to become what 
it is not.” Human beings are thus free to become what they will. But 
“becoming” for a person is never achieving a substantive thickness, since 
a for-itself can never become the in-itself. Rather what a person becomes 
is precisely the accumulation of his actions, the sum total of directing 
himself toward the in-itself of the world.
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In his later book, on Jean Genet, Sartre’s ontological duality re-appears 
as a distinction between two modes, that of being and that of doing. In the 
mode of being, a person strives to be an object and acts in order to achieve 
object-hood. Sartre writes that in this mode a person wishes to “encounter 
this substance which defines him… One must be open to Being as the 
mystic is open to his God.” (p. 75) In the mode of doing, a person aims to 
be a subject, a consciousness. Since these two modes co-exist in Genet, 
Genet steals in order to be a thief. But he also is a thief in order to steal. 
Sartre includes in this book an extensive presentation of how Christianity 
teaches a dual striving for both being and doing, a paradox of tension at 
the heart of Christian religiosity.
For Sartre, the universal bad faith of humanity is the desire to make 
of oneself the in-itself, to imagine that one is a substance like a stone. It 
is bad faith because each of us has an intuition of our freedom, of our 
lack of substantial being, of our being a for-itself. So I know that I am 
a for-itself. Thus I may not be satisfied simply to wait on tables, as in 
Sartre’s example, I might want to be a waiter, to be a veritable clump of 
waiterhood. To this end I will adopt exaggerated, ingratiating acts towards 
customers, and will rush back and forth to the kitchen in great earnestness, 
to convince – myself - that I was made to be a waiter, cast in stone. I will 
try to be very sincere about my job, sincerity, for Sartre, being a mark of 
bad faith, involving my trying to be true to myself. As though I have an 
essence, an inner rock that I am. Thus do humans attempt to avoid the 
freedom of the for-itself by pretending to be the in-itself, at the same 
time preserving the for-itself of their own consciousness. This impossible 
task lies at the heart of human existential anxiety.
Now, we can understand Sartre’s critique of Christian mystics. 
Christian mystics exemplify bad faith at its worst – pretending to have 
discovered that they belong to the substance of God sufficiently so as 
to receive for themselves a substantive, in-itself form of being. Listen to 
Meister Eckhart when he declares: “God’s self-identity is my self-identity, 
nothing less nor more.” “Self-identity,” happens to be one of Sartre’s 
favored phrases when characterizing the in-itself. The in-itself has self-
identity in the sense that it is what it is. A for-itself has no self-identity 
in the sense that it is a going out of itself to the in-itself, taking on the 
content of the in-itself in consciousness. And listen to Augustine declare: 
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“I find stability and solidity in you.” Christian mysticism, Sartre believes, 
is motivated by the profound bad faith of asserting oneself as the in-itself, 
indeed as the ultimate in-itself. In Sartre’s eyes Christian mysticism is 
a succumbing to the mode of being in the most perverted way.
II.
Thus goes Sartre’s critique of Christian mysticism. Now I want to suggest 
what a Christian mystic might say in reply. First of all, he will certainly 
question Sartre’s ontological dogma that nothing can be both the in-itself 
and a for-itself. Perhaps this is true with regard to the same aspect of 
a being, but why can there not be both of these ontological categories in 
different aspects of the same being? There does not seem to be a good 
reason why the mystic should accept Sartre’s dogma. Despite the sub-title 
of Being and Nothingness as: “An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology,” 
others have pointed out before me that Sartre’s dualistic ontology is 
not well founded in phenomenology, but seems to be a straight-out 
metaphysical assumption. If so, there is no good reason for the Christian 
mystic to think that a belief that one is ultimately one with the substance 
of God is a case of bad faith.
But there is much more that a Christian mystic could say here in 
reply to Sartre. I propose that such a mystic could see Sartre as grasping 
at important, true insights of Christian mysticism, but unfortunately 
letting them slip through his fingers. Here is what I mean.
Our mystic begins with the conviction that humans have an intui-
tion of God, even if confused and subdued, even to the point of being 
subliminal. He will endorse what Aquinas writes at the beginning of the 
Summa Theologica (Q2:A1): To know that God exists in a general and 
confused way is implanted in us by nature…. This, however, is not to know 
absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching 
is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is 
Peter who is approaching.
To the mystic, however, this dim intuition is more than simply to the 
effect that God exists. It is an implicit recognition of one’s own self being 
included in the very being of God. It is this pre-mystical presentiment, dim 
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and amorphous, that comes to full realization in the mystical conscious-
ness. And the Christian mystic might want to recognize that in Sartre 
this intuition has come close to the surface, yet Sartre misunderstands 
what it is he has seen.
Thus, our mystic will want to say that when Sartre asserts that a person 
has no self-substance, Sartre is seeing through a glass darkly what the 
Christian mystic has discovered – that a person has no distinct self-being, 
because he exists only in the encompassing being of God. Since Sartre is blind 
to God, however, Sartre interprets the emptiness of self-being as the exclu-
sionary category of the for-itself, and misses the true import of his insight.
And when Sartre asserts that the human being has a universal desire 
to be the in-itself, Sartre prophesizes, knowing not what he is prophesying. 
For to the Christian mystic, the desire for substantive being is an expres-
sion of the vague human intuition of being included in the substance of 
God. Thus the search of human beings for self-substance is a seeking for 
their true nature – in God, which they know only obscurely. They see 
someone, as Aquinas said, but know not who it is. Since Sartre is blind 
to God, Sartre is unable to see what the Christian mystic sees, and can 
see it only as bad-faith.
Likewise, Sartre has it just right that human existential anxiety is 
rooted in the frustrated desire to be the in-itself. Since he has become 
blind to God, however, Sartre fails to see that this anxiety comes because 
ordinary attempts at being an in-itself are misplaced attempts at achieving 
substantive being in God. We want to be a homosexual, or to be a saint, to 
use Sartre’s own examples, rather than achieving our substance by being 
absorbed in the being of God. Because one’s true substantive being is in 
God, any attempt to supply another substantive being to oneself creates 
self-alienation and existential frustration. It is only when the mystic finds 
his own being in God that self-alienation is overcome and existential 
anxiety disappears in the tranquility of being.
Finally, our mystic would eagerly embrace Sartre’s proclamation that 
we have an intuition of our freedom. But for the mystic this intuition is 
nothing other than an intimation of the infinite freedom of God, within 
whose being we have our being. Since blind to God, Sartre mistakenly 
assigns our intuition of our freedom to our exclusive for-itself ontology.
Thus I imagine the Christian mystic’s reply to Sartre.
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III.
So, we have two metaphysical outlooks here: one - theistic mysticism, and 
the other - atheism. And the question I now want to address is - what was 
the source, the basis, of Sartre’s atheism? You will not find in Sartre an 
argument from evil, as in Voltaire. Nor will you find critiques of arguments 
for God’s existence as with Hume. In Being and Nothingness we do find 
a proof against God existence. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre turned his 
dichotomous ontological scheme of the in-itself and the for-itself into 
a quick ontological proof of the non-existence of God. God is supposed 
to be both a substantive being, an it-itself, with givenness like a stone, 
and also possessed of the consciousness of a for-itself. But these two 
ontological categories are incompatible. It is not possible for anything 
to be both the in-itself and a for-itself. Hence, God does not exist. End 
of proof. But listen to what he says about this argument in conversation 
with Simone de Beauvoir: “In Being and Nothingness I set out reasons for 
my denial of God’s existence that were not actually the real reasons.”2 
In these conversations, Sartre tells de Beauvoir that he advanced 
his ontological proof only because he felt the need to vindicate his 
belief philosophically. (p. 436). So what was the starting place of 
his atheism? Sartre tells this story to de Beauvoir, which appears 
in a slightly different version in his autobiography of his youth, 
The Words:
When I was about twelve … in the morning I used to take the tram with the 
girls next door... One day I was walking up and down outside their house for 
a few minutes waiting for them to get ready. I don’t know where the thought 
came from or how it struck me, yet all at once I said to myself, “God doesn’t 
exist.”…. As I remember very well, it was on that day and in the form of 
a momentary intuition, that I said to myself, “God doesn’t exist.”
Sartre calls this realization an “intuition,” and later wrote that God’s 
non-existence had become “manifest” to him at that moment. Early in 
2 Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux, A Farewell to Sartre, trns. Patrick O’Brian (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 437. 
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The Words, Sartre recounts an earlier problem with God when he writes 
that “as a boy I needed a Creator; I was given a big boss.”3
Considering these passages, it would be easy to make light of Sartre’s 
atheism as being the result of a flippant childhood whim. But that would 
be a mistake. Instead, I suggest that Sartre had an early serious intuition 
that led him to his own brand of mystical experience, just as mystical 
intuition leads the theistic mystic to experience God as the ground of 
his being. But Sartre’s mysticism is not theistic atheism. Sartre was an 
atheistic mystic.
To flesh out my idea I take you to the definition of mystical experience 
given by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy defines a mystical experience as an alleged: “unitive experi-
ence granting knowledge of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind 
not accessible by way of sense-perception, somato-sensory modalities, or 
standard introspection.” A “unitive experience” involves a phenomeno-
logical de-emphasis, blurring, or eradication of multiplicity, where the 
noetic significance of the experience is deemed to lie precisely in that 
phenomenological feature.
The Christian mystic’s experience of himself as included in the being 
of God, qualifies as mystical” because allegedly unitive in the way the 
definition specifies. The Encyclopedia calls this a “super sense-perceptual 
experience,” allegedly involving non-sensory perception-like content, 
given by a “spiritual” sense, appropriate to a non-physical realm.
Now, the Encyclopedia recognizes a second category of unitive 
experience, “sub sense-perceptual experience,” allegedly either devoid 
of phenomenological content altogether, or nearly so, or consisting of 
phenomenological content appropriate to sense perception, but lacking 
in the conceptualization typical of attentive sense perception. An example 
of this would be the Buddhist experience of “unconstructed awareness.” 
In this, the lack of conceptual configuration affords the subject a unitive 
experiential knowledge of true reality. In Yogacara Buddhism, for exam-
ple, the notion is prominent that vikalpa, or “conceptual construction,” 
constructs a world of distinct material objects, of objects and properties, 
and of distinct selves, including one’s own self. Vikalpa creates language, 
3 Jean Paul Sartre, The Words, tr. Bernard Frechtman (New York : G. Braziller, 1964), p. 61.
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cementing division and classification into our awareness. In unconstructed 
awareness one comes to experience the utter “indescribability of things” as 
they are in themselves. Unconstructed awareness, parinispanna, is a unitive 
experience, allegedly conferring knowledge, disclosing reality as utter 
“tathata,” or “thusness,” seamless, without divisions. Therefore, the Buddhist 
claim for unconstructed awareness as unitive deserves to be called non-
theistic mysticism.
There are also incipient, partial unconstructed mystical experiences, 
one kind of which Walter Stace called “extrovertive experiences.” In these 
experiences, the subject has sensory perception in which distinctions blur, 
become elusive, and appear unreal. The unitive sense impinges upon the 
sensory data to provide what the subject takes to be a glimpse into the 
true nature of reality, namely the undifferentiated reality provided in fully 
unconstructed awareness.
Now, let’s return to Sartre, the mystical atheist. In The Words, Sartre 
writes of his first major work and its central character: “At the age of thirty, 
I executed the masterstroke of writing Nausea…. I was Roquentin; I used 
him to show, without complacency, the texture of my life.” (Pp. 157-158). 
In the novel Nausea, Sartre tells the story of the existential travails of 
Antoine Roquentin, a young man, a writer, who resides temporarily in 
a small French town. Antoine’s story revolves around the meaning, or 
lack of it, he finds in the historical research in which he is engaged. The 
central event of the novel takes place in a park that Antoine visits from 
time to time. This time, however, looking at a chestnut tree, Antoine has 
an experience he never had before. Here are some excerpts:4
(1) And suddenly, suddenly, the veil is torn away, I have understood, I have 
seen. (p. 170)
(2) I had this vision. It left me breathless. (p. 171)
(3) And then all of a sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had sud-
denly unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract category: 
it was the very paste of things, this root was kneaded into existence. Or 
rather the root, the park gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had 
4 All quotations are from Jean Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: 
New Directions Publishing Company, 1964).
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vanished: the diversity of things, their individuality, were only an appear-
ance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all 
in disorder—naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness. (pp. 171-72)
(4) In vain I tried to count the chestnut trees….each of them escaped the rela-
tionship in which I tried to enclose it, isolated itself, and overflowed. (p. 173)
(5) And without formulating anything clearly, I understood that I had 
found the key to Existence…. In fact, all that I could grasp beyond that 
returns to this fundamental absurdity. Absurdity: another word; I struggle 
against words. (p. 173)
(6) This moment was extraordinary. I was there, motionless and icy, 
plunged in a horrible ecstasy. But something fresh had just appeared in 
the very heart of this ecstasy. The essential thing is contingency. I mean 
that one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply to be there…
.I believe there are people who have understood this. Only they tried to 
overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. But 
no necessary being can explain existence: contingency is not a delusion, 
a probability which can be dissipated; it is the absolute, consequently, the 
perfect free gift. (p. 177)
(7) I was the root of the chestnut tree. Or rather I was entirely conscious 
of its existence. Still detached from it—since I was conscious of it—yet 
lost in it, nothing but it. (p. 177)
(8) I knew it was the World, the naked World suddenly revealing itself, 
and I choked with rage at this gross, absurd being. (p. 178)
I cannot emphasize enough how much of this description is typical 
in reports of mystical experiences. The veil is lifted, one sees, an enormous 
truth is revealed, one has discovered the key to Existence, the absolute, 
one cannot move, there is ecstasy, things flow into one another, what one 
is experiencing is ineffable, there is talk of essential reality, the dissolution 
of the self into the content of the experience, and so on.
Compare Sartre’s description of Antoine’s experience to some of 
the expressions in the following theistic mystical experience reported by 
William James:
I remember the night, and almost the very spot on the hilltop, where my soul 
opened out, as it were, into the Infinite, and there was a rushing together of 
the two worlds, the inner and the outer…. I stood alone with Him who had 
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made me, and all the beauty of the world, and love, and sorrow, and even 
temptation. I did not seek Him, but felt the perfect unison of my spirit with 
His, The ordinary sense of things around me faded. For the moment nothing 
but an ineffable joy and exultation remained. It is impossible fully to describe 
the experience. It was like the effect of some great orchestra when all the 
separate notes have melted into one swelling harmony that leaves the listener 
conscious of nothing save that his soul is being wafted upwards, and almost 
bursting with its own emotion. The perfect stillness of the night was thrilled by 
a more solemn silence, The darkness held a presence that was all the more felt 
because it was not seen, I could not any more have doubted that He was there 
than that I was. Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the less real of the two.
Antoine’s was a unitive experience, in which distinctions blurred like 
colors running into each other in a washed garment. Antoine’s mystical 
experience is an embryonic instance of an unconstructed awareness - 
distinctions becoming elusive to the point of disappearing, as in Antoine’s 
saying that he was the chestnut tree. And from the nature of this mystical 
experience Antoine comes to know that there is no God. He has seen that 
reality has no character, no structure, no intrinsic meaning. But if there 
were a God, reality would have character, structure, and intrinsic meaning. 
So, by experience Sartre now knows that God is missing in the world, knows 
God’s absence. No wonder that Sartre says of his writing of Nausea, “As 
a mystic, I attempted to reveal the silence of being by a thwarted rustling 
of words….” (p. 157).
Now, insofar as Antoine lives the texture of Sartre’s life, as Sartre has 
testified, Sartre is not blind to God, as the Christian mystic charged. As 
far as Sartre is concerned, he has seen reality as it truly is, has seen that all 
of existence is absurd, superfluous, and utterly contingent. He has seen 
that all that is melts together unless the mind arbitrarily applies vikalpa 
to that which is “without form, and void.” He has seen the in-itself and 
it is not God. All of this is given to him phenomenologically. And this, 
I suggest, is the real basis for Sartre’s rejection of God and his rejection 
of theistic mysticism. Sartre is an atheistic mystic. His mysticism begins 
with an intuition at an early age that there is no God. Then, when mature, 
Sartre has an atheistic mystical experience. Thereafter he seeks philosophi-
cal vindication in his ontological proof against God’s existence that he 
presents in Being and Nothingness.
137JEan paul sarTrE: ThE mysTical aThEisT
There is a further aspect of Sartre’s experience that parallels Christian 
mysticism – and that is the Christian mystic’s “dark night of the soul.” The 
Christian mystic’s appropriation of his mystical knowledge is a long-term 
affair requiring great diligence. In his or her travails, the mystic is prone 
to the “dark night of the soul.” The latter term was coined by the 15th 
century Spanish mystic, John of the Cross, to refer to a time of purgation 
leading the mystic to ultimate salvation. In Catholic theology the phrase 
has come to describe a tumble from the mystical knowledge that one has 
attained. It entails a dryness of the spirit, a losing of ground, and even 
the arising of doubts - doubts whether the experience was genuine. Just 
so, Sartre acknowledges that material atheism is a long drawn-out work, 
and he too goes through a dark night of the soul, that of a mystical atheist. 
Here are two examples. In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre endorses 
an idea he attributes to Dostoyevsky, namely, that if God does not exist, 
all is permitted. Yet, late in life, Sartre told de Beauvoir that he no longer 
agreed with Dostoyevsky, because he was convinced that it was absolutely 
wrong to kill another human being. And in his late conversations with 
de Beauvoir Sartre makes this astounding declaration: “I don’t see myself 
as so much dust that has appeared in the world, but as a being that 
was expected, prefigured, called forth… this idea of a creating hand that 
created me refers me back to God.” (Adieux, p. 438). Sartre refers to these 
and similar sentiments of his later in life as “remaining traces of God.” 
While I am not about to claim that underneath it all Sartre really believed 
in God, I do want to say that his atheistic faith, grounded in a mystical 
awareness of God’s non-existence was challenged at various points in 
Sartre’s life, in an atheistic “dark night of the soul.”
To conclude, we have here two opposing mystical conceptions of 
life and of reality that nonetheless share some significant features. Each 
is rooted in a prior intuition, followed by mystical experience, and then 
followed by a dark night of the soul.
Sartre’s deepest atheistic inclinations are not those of a philosopher 
or even those of an existentialist. They are those of a mystic.
